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ABSTRACT
The great majority of the Russians did not support their country’s military intervention 
in Chechnya during the 1994-96 Russo-Chechen War. During the Second Chechen War, 
however, beginning in the autumn of 1999, a turnaround occurred. Now a majority of 
Russians stood behind their government’s decision to regain control over the hitherto 
independent Chechnya. Such support was in part in response to a string of high-pro-
file terrorist attacks in Russian cities by Chechen rebels and the spread of the separatist 
movement into neighboring provinces such as Dagestan. In addition, much of this shift 
in public support at the time was attributed to the pivotal role broadcast media played in 
the second Chechen war. This analysis focuses on the marked change in public perception 
by studying the Russian media, its role in shaping opinions, and how reporting from the 
conflict zone transformed Russian people’s attitudes.
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ÖZET
1994-96 yıllarındaki ilk Rus-Çeçen Savaşı’nda Rus halkı ülkelerinin Çeçenistan’a as-
keri müdahalede bulunmasını desteklememişti. Fakat, 1999 güzündeki II. Çeçen Savaşı 
sırasında olaylar tersine döndü. Artık Rus halkının büyük bir çoğunluğu Çeçenistan’ın o 
zamana kadar bir yönüyle sürdürebildiği “bağımsızlığı” karşısında kontrolü yeniden ka-
zanması için devletin kararlarını destekler hale geldi. Bu desteğin nedeni Çeçen direniş-
çilerin Rus şehirlerine yapılan bir dizi terör saldırısına tepki göstermek ve ayrılıkçı hare-
ketin Dağıstan gibi çevre eyaletlere yayılmasında yatmaktaydı. Ayrıca, kamuoyundaki bu 
fikir değişikliğinde II. Çeçen savaşı sırasında medyanın rolünün oldukça önemli olduğu 
değerlendirilmektedir. Bu analiz,  toplumsal algıdaki değişime odaklanarak, medyanın 
nasıl fikirleri şekillendirdiğine ve nasıl çatışma bölgesinden bildirerek Rus halkının bakış 
açısını değiştirdiğini incelemiştir.          
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The first Chechen war started in mid-December 1994 and continued until mid-
August 1996. The majority of Russians were opposed to the war from the very 
beginning, as Russia was making war with its own population. According to 
polls conducted by the Moscow-based Public Opinion Foundation shortly after 
Russian forces entered Chechnya, and again in January 1995, 63% and 71% 
respectively opposed sending the military forces into the region.1 In a second 
poll, just over half (52%) of respondents condemned the action of the Russian 
military, while 20% approved.2 In a conference paper published in 2000 Emil 
Pain, Boris Yeltsin’s former Chechnya adviser, also claimed that “two-third of 
respondents” were “opposed to the use of military solution in dealing with the 
problem during the 1995 military campaign.3 Near the end of 1995, when figh-
ting in Chechnya was far less intensive than in spring of the same year, polls 
demonstrated  that popular opposition to the war was still running high, and to 
such a degree that that it could threaten Yeltsin’s re-election at the forthcoming 
presidential elections. Upon a successful election, Yeltsin obtained yet another 
mandate from Russian voters, but, he faced strong competition in the first round 
of the ballot from General Aleksandr Lebed, whose platform was largely based 
on peacefully putting an end to the war in Chechnya.
In late September 1999, when Russian forces were mobilized and sent back 
into Chechen territory, the overall mood of the Russian people’s towards the war 
shifted in the opposite direction. According to an article that appeared in Nezavi-
simaya Gazeta, in mid-October 1999, just under half (49%) of respondents in a 
national poll expressed “support for an air campaign against Chechnya.”4 Even 
after launching massive air strikes on Groznyy and the escalation of the Russian 
forces’ military operations outside the so-called “security zone,” which was cre-
ated in northern Chechnya, the Russian people remained largely supportive of 
the Army’s attacks. A Public Opinion Foundation poll conducted in November 
1999 demonstrated that among 2,000 respondents, nearly two-thirds (64%) sup-
ported “the Russian forces’ military actions in Chechnya,” while just under one 
1 See Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: from Gazavat to 
Jihad, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International, 2010), p. 34.
2 Ibid.
3 Emil Pain, “Vozmozhnye varianty dinamiki vtoroj chechenskoj vojny”, paper presented at the 
conference “The International Community and Strategies for Peace and Stability in and around 
Chechnya”, (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 27-28 April 2000).
4 Vladimir Degojev, “Russia’s Dirty War, Again”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 October 1999, (http://
www.ng.ru/english/dirty_war.html).
Richard ROUSSEAU
108
in four respondents (23%) were opposed. In January 2000, support had reached 
two thirds (67%), while the percentage against the war stood at less than a quar-
ter (22%). In an interview to the Russian journal Russkaya Mysl in mid-March 
2000, Yuri Leveda, director of the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center 
(VTsIOM), stated that “nearly 70% of the population supports the war.”5 
There was not only a striking change in public attitude to military action in 
Chechnya but also an overall change in attitude that had transpired over a re-
markably short span of time. The majority of Russians, according to Emil Pain, 
categorically opposed any suggestion of resuming hostilities with Chechnya in 
the spring of 1999. Furthermore, a poll indicated that eight out of ten (82%) of 
Russians were even ready “in one form or another to accept Chechnya’s separa-
tion from Russia.”6 
Yuri Levada also confirmed this shift in attitude. In a May 2000 interview 
with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, he noted that “the war, while not so long ago consid-
ered a curse, now proves popular. In May, he continued, of last year (1999), as 
you know, an impeachment attempt was brought against the President (Yeltsin) 
and the most critical count in the accusation was the war in Chechnya. At the 
time, nearly eight in ten respondents (76%) favored Yeltsin’s departure because 
of his handling of the war. Less than a year later Russians seemed pleased with 
the war!” However, only 15% were actually ready to take up arms and join the 
Army on the battlefield.7
The main assumption of this article is that the control of the media helped 
the Russian government justify the war and ultimately to “win” it. The Kremlin 
learned the lesson of the of the first Chechen war (1994-1996), which ended in 
fiasco in terms of Russia’s image in the world, the reputation of the armed forces 
and Russian citizens’ respect towards their political leaders.
Socio-Psychological Factors
What caused the quick change in public attitudes towards the use of military 
force in Chechnya in 1999-2000? Complex causal relations are difficult to study 
because political, social, economic and psychological factors played a role in this 
5 See Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union?, 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.121.
6 Emil Pain, “Vozmozhnye varianty dinamiki vtoroj chechenskoj vojny”, p. 6.
7 Ibid.
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turnaround in Russian public opinion. The second military campaign in Chech-
nya began in late September 1999 after Russian troops a month before had defe-
ated a group of Muslim-fundamentalist rebels (the so-called Wahhabists) in the 
Republic of Dagestan and forced out a group of Chechen-based militants led by 
the notorious field commander Shamil Basayev, who had participated in the rebel 
insurgency in Dagestan. 
Russian forces’ successful military operation against what the new Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called “international terrorists” came at a time 
when popular confidence in the Kremlin’s capabilities was at its lowest level; the 
armed forces’ prestige and standing had reached rock bottom in the aftermath of 
the unpopular and unsuccessful first Chechen War. In addition, the hope for im-
provement in social conditions had dwindled in the wake of the economic crisis 
that hit Russia hard in the autumn of 1998. Finally, those who had the energy to 
take an interest in politics felt severely humiliated by Russia’s increasing margin-
alization in the international arena.8
Emil Pain’s analysis of the Russians’ socio-psychological reaction to the op-
eration in Dagestan was probably close to reality: “Tired of defeats (economic, 
political, and military), greater Russian society suddenly developed a thirst for 
victories. Then came messages from Dagestan that the armed forces had tri-
umphed over bandits who had entered the republic from Chechnya. The mood of 
the Russian public had literally changed overnight. People began to believe that 
it is also possible to finally resolve the Chechen problem by the use of force and 
by bringing about law and order throughout the country with ‘an iron hand,’ – an 
image that suddenly materialized in the form of Putin’s own flesh and blood.”9
The successful military operations in remote and extraneous Dagestan, in 
itself, was hardly enough to cause such a drastic change in Russians’ attitude 
towards the war. The decisive turning point came shortly after dozens of Mus-
lim-led insurgents were killed in Dagestan and Basayev group had to retreat to 
Chechnya. Shortly thereafter, on September 4, 1999 an apartment block blew up 
in Buynaksk, a small provincial town in Dagestan, located some 40 km south-
west of Makhachkala, the capital. It was followed on September 9 and 13 by 
similar deadly explosions in three apartment blocks in Moscow and Volgodonsk. 
8 See, Jan Koehler, Potentials of Disorder: Explaining Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and 
in the Former Yugoslavia, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 232-250.
9 Emil Pain, “Vozmozhnye varianty dinamiki vtoroj chechenskoj vojny”, p. 4.
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This series of apartment block bombings, which killed at least 300 people and 
sent shockwaves throughout all of Russia, was attributed by President Putin to 
“international terrorists.”10 It is reasonable to believe, considering the events at 
the time, that the powerful bombings of apartment blocks where just ordinary 
Russians lived, and Putin’s insinuations about who was likely behind these vio-
lent acts, were the main reasons for the abrupt change in attitude toward the war 
as a mean to conflict resolution.11
Another factor that most likely played a role was the NATO bombing of Ser-
bia (still part of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at that time) during the Kosovo 
War which lasted from March 24, 1999 to June 11, 1999.12 Within many circles in 
the Kremlin, but also in large segments of the Russian population, it was believed 
that if NATO countries could legitimatize carrying out air strikes on military 
targets in the sovereign territory of Serbia, then it was certainly justifiable for 
Russia to carry out bombing raids against an enemy suspected of having links 
with terrorist organizations and perpetuating violent crimes on its own territory.13
Although these events had major socio-psychological effects, again they are 
not sufficient on their own to explain the change of attitude towards war among 
Russian public opinion. In the following section, the role of the Russian mass 
media is added to the chain of causes and effects leading to the change in opinion 
pertaining to the Second Chechen War 
The Role of the Media
In modern societies the media, especially the national media covering the whole 
territory of a nation-state, have enormous influence on public consciousness. It is 
through the media that those who do not find themselves at the center of events 
get information about what is happening in their locality, country and the whole 
world. It is also by dint of the media that modern citizens put together their own 
explanatory framework for making sense of social events, political processes and 
policy decisions.
There were two TV channels operating on a national level at the time of the 
Second Chechen War.  One was RTV (The All-Russian State Television), which 
10 See Cindy D. Ness, Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization, 
(Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2007).
11 See Tracey C. German, Russia’s Chechen War, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 40-51.
12 See, Peter Van Ham, Mapping European Security After Kosovo, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), pp. 37-42.
13 Aleksandr Verkhovskij, “Novy revoljutsionery,” Russkaya Mysl, 18-24 November 1999, p. 6.
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was a full state-owned channel. The other, ORT (Pervii Kanal), which is the suc-
cessor of the Soviet Gosteleradio), was 51% owned by the Russian government. 
The other main broadcasting networks were privately-run NTV (the Independent 
Television) and TV Tsentr, which was established in the autumn of 1997 based 
on a decision by then-Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The two privately-owned 
TV broadcasters could only reach about one-third of the Russian population.14 
In comparison to the First Chechen War, the media coverage of the second 
military campaign in 1999 was much more one-sided both in the run-up to the 
war (a few months prior to the onset of hostilities) and during the hostilities. Par-
tiality in analyzing and reporting was highest in the initial phase of the bombings 
and this new media strategy implemented by the Russian government was crucial 
in not only altering public attitude to the war but also in cementing a pro-war 
sentiment among ordinary Russians.   
In a liberal and democratic society, the media acts as a “watchdog” in pro-
tecting the interests of diverse social groups. The unconstrained dissemination 
of information is a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy (and, for that 
matter, well-functioning markets). The existence of free media is also a prereq-
uisite for independent and vibrant civil society. A crucial factor that explains 
the Russian population’s change in attitude towards war as a problem-solving 
mechanism was the existence of a weakly-developed civil society and the poor 
performance of the Russian mass media in its role as a provider of information 
– acting as a so-called independent “watchdog.”15 The Russian media’s conduct 
during the 1999 war revealed that media networks were still not autonomous and 
abusively utilized by the Kremlin in its own interests and policy agendas.
Media’s Behavior during the First War
Already during the months leading up to the 1999 war Russian print media such 
as Izvestija, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Moskovskie Novosti presented a nuanced 
picture of what was happening in Chechnya and published skilled analysis of 
the sequence of events. The same could be observed also after the war broke out 
in 1999. The state-owned TV channels were however immediately subject to 
censorship, although this state policy was never really able to achieve its goal. 
14 See Sarah Oates & Gillian McCormack, “The Media and Political Communication”, in Stephen 
White (Ed.), Developments in Russian Politics 7, (Duke University Press, 2010).
15 See Robert Brannon, Russian Civil-Military Relations, (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2009).
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According to Western commentators, the Kremlin’s policy reminded them of the 
strict control which Soviet authorities exercised on the state-media information 
service during the first weeks after a military intervention in a satellite country. 
However, journalists’ body language, their ironic comments and other equivocal 
gestures transmitted “an entirely different message.” Censorship stranglehold on 
television could not be sustained for very long.16 
Privately owned newspapers and the independent television channel NTV 
– which had in particular a huge impact – covered the war in a very profes-
sional and balanced fashion. Vladimir Gusinsky, NTV’s owner and banker, dis-
approved of the military invasion. According to Western sources, he received 
repeated warnings from Yeltsin’s personal security chief, confidant and adviser, 
Aleksander Korzhakov.17 The private media also showed a picture of the war 
through different lenses, more nuanced. For example, the editor-in-chief of Ne-
zavisimaya Gazeta wrote articles supporting war, even though the newspaper’s 
own correspondents sent reports from the battlefield that sharply contrasted their 
boss’s editorial arguments and position.18 Generally speaking, the media acted as 
the “fourth power,” – that is, as a “watchdog.” 
Thus, the independent media did resist pressure from the authorities, which, 
despite the fact that President Yeltsin himself repeatedly insisted that he sup-
ported press freedom, tried to put limitations on the media. These were mani-
fested in different ways, from direct restrictions to burdensome and draw out ac-
creditation procedures for journalists.  Obtaining access to Russian ground forces 
was severely curtailed. Some journalist found other ways to get information, 
approaching Chechens rebels and their field commanders as their main source of 
information. The latter were very open to both Russian and foreign journalists 
and effectively supplied them with information that would have otherwise been 
impossible to obtain on the ongoing conflict. Having lost control over the media, 
Russian authorities went as far as accusing the media of having been bought 
“bought” by “Chechen bandits.”19
16 Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to 
Jihad, (Praeger, 2010), p. 88-95.
17 Michael McFaul, “A Precarious Peace. Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign 
Policy”, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1997/98.
18 Boris Kagarlitskij, “Chechnya: predvaritelnye itogi. Chechenskaya voyna v obshchestvennom 
mnenie”, Svobodnaya Mysl, Vol. 40, January 1997.
19 Robert W. Schaefer, op. cit., p. 50.
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However, it must be underscored that heavy and systematic criticism of the 
war was raised and carried on by a relatively limited number of main media 
outlets. At the regional level, Yeltsin-appointed governors, whose positions had 
been greatly strengthened after the disintegration of regional Soviets in the wake 
of power showdown in Moscow in October 1993, reigned supreme over much of 
the regional media.20
Sergey Kovalev, a human rights activist, one of a few journalists who contrib-
uted the most to contradict the state propaganda, was outspoken from the very 
onset of the war. He hung about in Grozny during the indiscriminate bombing of 
the city and ground assault on the Chechen Republic in January 1995 and later he 
appeared frequently on the independent channel NTV. In an article published in 
The New York Review of Books in 1997, he wrote: “The war was won by freedom 
of speech. By the several dozen honest journalist – just a few – who continued to 
describe the truth about Chechnya to hundred of thousands of readers and with 
the help of millions of television viewers, despite having been pressured from the 
government. They were forced to broadcast official lies as well as the truth. But 
we are adults and know how to distinguish lies from truth”.21
An Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) poll conducted in February and 
March 1995 showed that 60% of respondents trusted the Moscow-based media, 
while 37% did not. “Of the variety of sources participants used to follow the 
unfolding crisis in Chechnya, reporting by the Independent Television, radio and 
press are considered the most trustworthy,” stated the authors of an article pub-
lished in the magazine Transitions.22 Ordinary Russians could watch the death 
and flight of Chechen noncombatants, the destruction of homes and factories on 
major Russian TV news with their own eyes. That led even to demonstrations 
on the streets of Moscow against the military action. The unfettered diffusion of 
media reports from battle areas was viewed by many as a confirmation that Rus-
sian reporting had recovered from Soviet censorship.23
20  Ibid.
21 Sergei Kovalev, “Russia after Chechnya”, The New York Review of Books, Vol. 31, 17 July 1997.
22 Susan Gigli,& Matthew Warshaw, “Trust Wary in Russia’s Media,” Transition, 28 July 1995, p. 
52.
23 See Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2001).
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Between the Two Wars
While critical journalists had demonstrated during most of the last war that they 
took their ‘watchdog’ role quite seriously, it soon became apparent that they were 
willing to give up this role for tactical reasons. During the presidential election 
in the summer of 1996, they made common cause with business “oligarchs” in 
ensuring that Yeltsin stayed in power. Both journalists and “financial princes” 
sought to prevent Gennady Zyuganov, the First Secretary and leader of the Com-
munist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) from winning the elections. For 
that reason, they were willing to support the re-election of President Yeltsin. That 
strategic act revealed that journalists and ‘liberal forces’ could be collectively 
mobilized in supporting specific and shared political objectives.24 
The TV channel NTV, which had been a leading organization in criticizing 
Yeltsin’s 20-month war in Chechnya, the state-owned ORT, whose shares were 
distributed between state agencies (51%) and private shareholders – mainly Bo-
ris Berezovsky – the fully state-owned RTV, all stood behind Yeltsin during the 
presidential election campaign. Igor Malashenko, director of NTV, in an inter-
view in mid-April 1996 claimed that if Russian independent media had covered 
the 1996 presidential election in an “unbiased” fashion, “professionally and ob-
jectively,” Zyuganov would have won the election and journalists would have 
permanently lost their freedom of expression. Consequently, they figured out 
that it was better for their self-interests to be used as a temporary “propaganda 
tool”.25 Progressively, pragmatism came to dominate among journalists – the end 
justified the means – and in the 1999 Russian-Chechen war it overshadowed their 
previous ‘watchdog’ role.  
There are several explanations – not just political ones – for the journalists’ 
new approach to their work. After the media’s efforts during the First Chech-
en War, it became clear that the media was a powerful weapon that not only 
politicians but also the increasingly self-conscious financiers could benefit in 
strengthening their power base. In 1994-95 there were still many small and cre-
ative media enterprises – especially in the print and press sector – which were 
guided by the model that was established after the Russian media had rid itself of 
24 See Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, (New York: New 
York University Press, 2000), pp. 110-120.
25 Laura Belin, “Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media”, paper presented at the 
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, (Washington: Annual Congress, 
November 1997). 
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the Communist Party’s media control; that is, they had editorial collectives and 
boards independent from governmental agencies whose objective was to control 
the national press. However, due to rising production and distribution costs and 
reduced purchasing power among consumers, newspapers were forced to seek 
new funding sources as subscriptions and advertisement revenues were quickly 
dwindling and drying up.  
It was at that moment that the so-called “oligarchs” seized on the opportunity 
to tighten their grip on media companies. For example, Vitaly Tretyakov, Ne-
zavisimaya Gazeta chief editor, on several occasions had refused both financial 
aid and sponsorship from wealthy Russians in order to maintain the newspaper’s 
editorial independence. However, in the autumn of 1995 he finally gave in and 
sought financial help from one of the most prominent of the ‘financial baron,’ 
Boris Berezovsky.26 In the mid-1990s Vladimir Gusinsky of Most Bank (which 
was founded in 1991 with Moscow City Council as its main client) made an 
incursion into the media sector. He quickly built up a media empire centered on 
NTV, the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the popular Segodnya tabloid type newspa-
per and Itogi magazine.
Despite these takeovers by the new Russian “business class,” the dependency 
of the media on ‘financial barons’ was still not a fact of life in modern day Rus-
sia; the media remained mostly independent from the control of ‘financial bar-
ons.’ The situation started to change in the second half of the 1990s. During the 
1996 presidential election the newspaper Obshchaya Gazeta, headed by Yegor 
Yakovlev, had retained a relatively independent editorial policy and autonomy 
in its financing. It was no longer possible in the summer of 1997 and it asked 
for Gusinsky’s help.27 After the 1996 presidential election very few newspapers 
that had formally been owned by groups of journalists could afford to do without 
financial backing from ‘financial barons.’ The problem lay in the fact that very 
few small and medium size enterprises in the media sector had reached a level of 
development that would allow them to advertise their product on a larger scale.28 
The only alternative for small-size newspapers and broadcasters was to knock 
at the door of oligarchs’ conglomerates. The difficulty of finding new sources of 
revenues was further exacerbated by the financial crisis that hit Russia in the au-
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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tumn of 1998. Many media enterprises had bought so-called GKO bonds ((Gosu-
darstvennoye Kratkosrochnoye Obyazatyelstvo, short-term Russian government 
Treasury Bills) introduced on May 7, 1993. In 1998 the Russian government 
defaulted on its GKO obligations and sent many media businesses into turmoil 
and even bankruptcy.
Some journalists, however, quickly realized that their alliances with financial 
barons were but a baited trap. It was the case, for instance, for Izvestia journal-
ists who sold shares to the Lukoil group at the end of 1996.29 In April 1997 the 
newspaper published an article that claimed that the then Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin had made a fortune by exploiting his government position. Lukoil 
management vehemently protested. The newspaper, which described itself as an 
“all-national” newspaper of Russia, then decided to sell a percentage of its shares 
to Oneksimbank, which was owned by the oligarch Vladimir Potanin who had 
close governmental ties in the hope that this would force Lukoil to tone down its 
protest campaign against Izvestia. But Oneksimbank and Lukoil joined together 
and called for the Chief Editor Igor Golombiovskij to resign. In the ensuing years 
Izvestia’s editorial positions and treatment of information echoed in its pages 
Oneksimbank’s interests, that is, Potanin’s interests.30 
The Media as the Voice of Warring ‘Financial Princes’
The oligarchs’ increasing foothold in the Russian media industry drove the latter 
to give a greater voice to certain financial interests, which resulted in a seri-
es of “media wars.” In the summer of 1997 ORT, Berezovsky-controlled ORT 
and Nezavisimaya Gazeta led a smear campaign against Deputy Prime Ministers 
Anatoly Tchubais and Boris Nemtsov and Oneksimbank in the battle for control 
of Russia’s large telecommunications company Svyazinvest. Gusinsky-control-
led NTV and Segodnya newspaper also took part in the attacks. (Both Bere-
zovsky and Gusinsky were interested in buying Svyazinvest.) Newspapers in 
which Oneksimbank – the eventual ‘winner’ – had a control stake also launched 
their own campaign in support for Tchubais and Nemtsov and lobbed scurrilous 
attacks Berezovsky.31 
In the summer of 1999 another media ‘war’ broke out between ORT/Ber-
ezovsky and NTV/Gusinsky. Contrary to the 1996 presidential election, this time 
29 Ibid.
30 See R. Nichol Ulric (Ed.), Focus on Politics and Economics of Russia and Eastern Europe, (New 
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007).
31 Laura Belin, “Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media”.
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it was unlikely that these media magnates would agree on a presidential can-
didate. NTV/Gusinsky supported Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov who had just 
formed his own political faction, Otechestvo (Fatherland) – it later merged with 
Vsya Rossiya (All Russia) to form the Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya Party – enter-
tained high hopes of success in the upcoming presidential election.32 Berezovsky, 
who now had close ties with Yeltsin’s inner circle, the so-called “family,” ac-
cused Luzhkov of spreading malicious rumors about shady deals having links 
with the Kremlin. Furthermore, ORT accused NTV/Gusinsky to undermine Rus-
sia’s economic stability. For its part, NTV hinted that Berezovsky was doing 
business with the Chechen terrorists.33 However, once this mudslinging came 
to an end, the editorial board of both NTV and ORT, in spite of their affiliation 
with ‘financial princes’ and other financial stakeholders, argued in their editorials 
that actually no one in Russia took the coverage of this ‘battle’ seriously. These 
NTV and ORT ‘reports’ never had credibility because it could have been easily 
suspected that they were dubious means used to weaken political opponents or 
business competitors.
Media during the Second Chechnya War 
Unlike in 1994-96, images of the military operation disseminated by the Russian 
mass media after the start of the Second Chechen War on August 26 were hea-
vily controlled by the Army and political authorities.34 Only in mid-November, 
a little more than a month after Russian troops had moved into Chechnya, began 
to emerge from the battleground a more nuanced picture of the armed conflict. 
But Between the launch of the war, in response to the invasion of Dagestan by 
the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB, one of three terrorist gro-
ups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas), and mid-November, the way the Russian 
media presented the conflict, both on television – including NTV – and in lea-
ding newspapers, resembled in many respects how Soviet authorities handled the 
coverage of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan twenty years before.35 
32 See Leon Rabinovich Aron, Russia’s Revolution: Essays 1989-2006, (Washington, DC: AEI 
Press, 2007).
33 Vitalij Tretyakov, “The Tale of Two Plots”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 October 1999, (http://
www.ng.ru/english/two_plots.html).
34 See, David R. Stone, A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in 
Chechnya, (Westport, Praeger, 2006).
35 Roland Dannreuther, Russia and Islam: State, Society and Radicalism, (Hoboken: Taylor & 
Francis, 2010), p. 76.
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Unsurprisingly, the war in Chechnya was treated only from a Russian perspec-
tive. The media showed the war and commented on it strictly from the Russian 
Generals and the Kremlin’s perspective. The military campaign was portrayed 
as a successful “operation,” intended not against a belligerent national group, 
but against a gang of “thugs” and ‘terrorists.” Unlike the images transmitted 
during the previous war, when the Russian public could watch and hear on the 
screen disoriented and poorly equipped soldiers next to cheerful Generals, this 
time around the media made every effort to shape a positive outlook on the war 
among the Russians. Now, the information being broadcasted were images of 
young and healthy Russian soldiers attacking training camps and arms depots 
of “terrorists.” These operations were taking place without significant cost in 
terms of casualties in the ranks of the Russian military or hardships among now 
grateful Chechen civilians.36
The tens of thousands of civilians who fled the battle zones were either invis-
ible or appeared on TV screens in circumstances where they were either given 
a helping hand by newly appointed pro-Russian authorities or provided pater-
nal guidance by vigilant and protective Russian generals. The Chechen guerilla 
forces (“terrorists”) were visible only when they could appear as prisoners or 
be portrayed as ‘losers.’ With few exceptions, Chechen counterattacks all but 
disappeared from the mainstream news. Funerals of lost Russian soldiers were 
announced in the media as national days of mourning and were observed with 
utmost dignity. The sorrow and sobbing of those who lost a son, a relative or a 
friend as a result of Russian forces’ bombing of Chechen villages were kept away 
from the public view, unless it served some PR value. Rare Chechen attacks 
shown on television served to foster anti-Chechen sentiment within Russia and 
further galvanize support for the Russian Army.37
Some newspapers, such as Moskovskie Novosti and the English-language 
New Times, painted a somewhat more subtle picture of the war, and sometimes 
even published interviews with representatives of the Chechen camp. However, 
these relatively few exceptions made no significant difference since the main-
stream media had whole heartily joined the chorus – as if the media were all 
plugged into the same outlet – praising the armed forces’ military actions in 
Chechnya and providing no dissenting voices Public opinion was influenced by 
36 Vicken Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics, 
(New York: Columbia University, 2009), pp. 67-80.
37 Ibid.
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large television channels which continually and unilaterally supplied Russians a 
positive view of the war and rarely underscored its human cost or moral issues. 
“This is totality government propaganda,” said Andrey Piontkovsky, an analyst 
at the Center for Strategic Studies in Moscow, in an interview with a Western 
correspondent in mid-October 1999. “All television channels and newspapers 
are filled with a single slogan: Liquidate them all, crush the scum, a patriotic war 
is underway.”38
TV viewers could see a difference between the three major Russian TV chan-
nels in their coverage of the war. On a question asked by an ITAR-TASS (In-
formation Telegraph Agency of Russia) reporter as to whether he believed it 
was normal, from an objective point of view, that Chechens could not be heard 
in the mainstream media, a TV viewers replied: “Should we let ‘bandits’ have 
their say? Nowhere in the world can you see anything like that.” Asked whether 
he believed that Russian attacks in Chechnya caused suffering among civilians, 
he replied: “This time they do not suffer.”39 The growing international criticism 
of Russian warfare in Chechnya was reported in limited doses on Russian TV 
channels, usually accompanied by negative or ironic comments from journalists 
or politicians. This type of reaction echoed throughout major TV channels when 
the European Council released a “Declaration on Chechnya” on December 10, 
1999 in which it “condemned” the intense bombing of Chechen cities, the threat 
leveled at the residents of Grozny and the ultimatum set by the Russian military 
commanders, as well as the treatment of the internally displaced persons as to-
tally “unacceptable” or when American President Bill Clinton publicly disap-
prove of Russian methods during his visit to Oslo on November 1 and 2, 1999.40
The one-sided coverage among the Russian population and the relaxation of 
negative impacts presented in all leading mass media – even those who had been 
critical during the First Chechen War – produced an attitude change in favor of 
the Kremlin’s policy of threatening or intimidating the Chechen people. The war 
was in political circles and the mass media consistently described as being an 
“anti-terrorist operation,” not as a war against the Chechen people. As soon as 
Shamil Basayev and his men retreated to Chechnya after giving a ‘helping hand’ 
38 Peter Graff, “Once Dovish Russia Media now Chechnya Hawks”, Russia Today, 20 October 
1999, (http://www.russiatoday.com/features.php3?id=102570).
39 Arkadii Babchenko, One Soldier’s War, (New York: Grove Press, 2008), p. 84.
40 Declaration on Chechnya from the Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 
11 December 1999, (http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/summit9912/chechnya.html).
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to Dagestani insurgents, Russian forces launched air strikes against “terrorist 
camps” located in the eastern part of Chechnya.41 Prime Minister Putin assured 
the Russian population that there were no attacks on peaceful villages in Chech-
nya, but only military operations to physically eliminate “terrorists.” Other Rus-
sian officials said attacks on Chechnya are aimed solely at “Islamic militants.”42
In a speech given at the State Duma on September 14, just a few days after a 
deadly bomb blast reduced a Moscow eight-story apartment building to a heap 
of bricks and dust and killed more than 100 people, including 10 children,43 Putin 
declared that he was “convinced that there is a Chechen connection in the Mos-
cow bombings” (NUPI Database September 15, 1999). He also stated during a 
Federal Council meeting that “a terrorist war against Russia had begun, and that 
those behind the attacks are expertly trained international saboteurs.”44 While 
Putin called for a series of resolute measures against Chechnya, including the 
creation of a cordon sanitaire around the Republic borders and the “destruction” 
of all Chechen guerrilla structures, he once again stressed that it was the group of 
“bandits, not the Chechen people” that had to be crushed.45 
Henceforth, Putin reiterated on many occasions that it was important to dis-
tinguish between Chechen bandits and the ordinary people of Chechnya. How-
ever, he never explained how it would be feasible in practice, nor did the Russian 
media outlets, which parroted the government’s insinuations about a link be-
tween the bombings in Moscow and Chechen terrorists. While Putin, in a televi-
sion interview broadcasted on October 16, 1999, once again stressed that it was 
important to distinguish between “bandits and peaceful Chechens, who are our 
citizens,”46 the journalist conducting the interview did not ask the sensible ques-
tion of how Russian pilots, who dropped bombs on Chechen villages, were able 
to distinguish between “bandits” and peaceful Chechens. 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, the longest serving  prime minister (1992-98) under 
Yeltsin presidency, could also without trouble answer questions form journalists 
41 M. de Haas, Russian Security and Air Power, 1992-2002: The Development of Russian Security 
Thinking under Yeltsin and Putin and its Consequences for the Air Forces, (London; New York: 
Frank Cass, 2004).
42 Timur Muzajev, “Politika strakha”, Russkaya Mysl, 23-29 November 1999, p. 3.
43 Angela Charlton, “116 Killed in Moscow Explosion”, The Associated Press, 14 September 1999.
44 Robert W. Schaefer, op. cit., p. 78.
45 Ibid
46 Ibid., p. 82.
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and get away with the following statement in a television interview a few days 
after Putin: “This time we have to admit that the Army is behaving properly 
and in civilized way.”47 Grigory Yavlinsky, an economist and liberal politician, 
who declared his opposition to the First Chechen War, could also affirm without 
impunity that “our armed forces are what they are. There are reasons to criticize 
them, but in this case it is necessary that we back them up.”48 Apparently, the 
journalist had a similar opinion on the war. He had no further questions.
The media’s uncritical acceptance of the official version of the attack on 
Chechnya as an operation that was directed solely against terrorists contributed 
to the Russian public view that the war just and needed. Politicians and civil soci-
ety actors’ silence on the problem of how Russian forces can distinguish between 
terrorists and non-terrorists created the impression that the problem was not real. 
During the 1994-96 war journalists critical of the Kremlin’s policy repeat-
edly reported that Russian forces were not – as alleged in the official propaganda 
– fighting against a “bunch of “thugs” led by the “corrupt” president Dzhokhar 
Dudayev, but against an enemy organized like a popular resistance movement. 
In 1999, it was also clear from the beginning that there was a popular resistance 
against the invasion of Russian forces. However, issues such as where did the 
Chechen “terrorists” get their logistic support from, or how it could be that the 
Chechen population refused to cooperate with the newly formed Russian puppet 
government, were never raised.49 
Unlike the first war, during which journalists criticized the legitimacy of 
some central government’s puppet bodies, they had this time to produce news 
reports emphasizing the legality and efficiency of the Army’s operation. Thus, 
Russian citizens were left with the impression that everything was going “ac-
cording to the plan.” Images of angry Chechens condemning Shamil Basayev’s 
interference in the Dagestani insurgency confirmed this impression. Moreover, 
popular media, news reports and commentaries provided by pundits never men-
tioned that Aslan Mashkadov, the legitimately Chechen elected president, also 
denounced Basayev’s incursion into Dagestan and repeatedly offered Moscow 
assistance in combating “terrorism” on the Chechen territory. The first measure 
47 Tracey C. German, op. cit., p. 54.
48 Ibid., p. 55.
49 See Yossef Bodansky, Chechen  Jihad: al Qaeda’s Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror, 
(New York, NY: Harper, 2007), p. 233.
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Putin took after the sequence of bombings in Moscow was to ingeniously reject 
President Mashkadov as illegitimate. He quickly became persona non grata with 
the Russian media as well as the central government. 
Emil Pain was one of the few Russian observers who believed that one had to 
distinguish between “terrorists” and “Chechnya’s armed separatists.” According 
to him, Basayev and his allied groups of rebels could not be equated with Presi-
dent Maskhadov and Chechen armed forces. In a newspaper article published in 
late December 1999, he claimed that “manipulation of the public opinion and the 
repression of critical opinions on State television is throwing us back to the pre-
perestroika period.”50 While many demonstrations involving soldiers, soldiers’ 
mothers and various strains of activists had been reported by the media during 
the 1994-96 war, this time there were remarkably few reports on the grassroots 
activities of this nature. Demonstrations did take place, however, only Western 
media informed their viewers and readers of such events. 
In a Moskovskie Novosti article, which appeared in a late December issue – 
when the media started to be more balanced in their coverage –, human rights ac-
tivist Sergei Kovalev wrote in the newspaper that many Western journalists often 
ask him if he is the only one who deplores the new war in Chechnya. There are, 
in reality, “quite a few” who openly oppose the war, wrote Kovalev. But “those 
who do not agree with the Russian authorities’ actions in Chechnya are totally 
denied access to the pages of the major print media and the influential electronic 
mass media avoid them. In view of the information blockade maintained by the 
authorities, it is astonishing that anyone has ever heard of my political views. (...) 
I’m not dumb, but ‘censors’ work only too well.”51 
In mid-November 1999, Russkaya Mysl carried an article by the Russian 
journalist Zoia Svetova, in which she attacked human rights organization for 
their quiescence in the face of persistent pattern of gross abuse of Chechen rights. 
Svetova had tried to get the article published in Moscow, but with no avail. “I 
submitted this article to a number of Moscow newspapers which I thought cov-
ered the war in Chechnya rather objectively. But not one of them believed it was 
necessary to read what human rights defenders had to say,” wrote Svetova in a 
Postscript to her article.52 
50 Sergei Kovalev, “Zachem nuzhny “vragi naroda”?”, Moskovskie Novosti, Vol. 7, 21-27 December 
1999.
51 Ibid.
52 Zoya Svetova, “Mechta o zheleznom zanavese. V chom vinovaty pravozashchitniki?”, Russkaja 
Mysl, 25  November – 1 December 1999, p. 5.
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As human rights activists like Sergei Kovalev, Yelena Bonner (Andrei Sakha-
rov’s widow) and priest Gleb Yakunin, who gained respect for their efforts dur-
ing the 1994-96 war, were almost invisible in the mainstream media, many 
Russians came to the conclusion that that if they do not protest against Russian 
troops’ behavior in Chechnya, it must signify that the current military operation 
is implemented in respect to internal and international laws. Human rights activ-
ists’ forced quietness was thus contributing to legitimize the war in the eyes of 
the public and helped the central government corralling widening support from 
disgruntled military and other interested social groups. Legitimation was also 
enhanced because the government could count among its supporters a number 
of famous Russian exiled philosophers and writers, such as Vasily Aksionov, 
Aleksandr Janov and Aleksander Zinoviev, who during the Communist regime 
were symbols of resistance against the Soviet system’s oppression and censor-
ship. With this backing, the Kremlin had more grist for its political and military 
agenda.
The impact of respected journalists who vented their anger about the ama-
teurish handling of the situation in Chechnya in 1994-96 but who now described 
in favorable terms military ground operations can also be counted as an influ-
ential factor in the change in public attitude. Many of these journalists began to 
feel an ever creeping sense of disappointment over the political developments 
in Chechnya. Their disillusionment about the political evolution in Grozny had 
already been made clear a few months before the outbreak of hostilities. “Unfor-
tunately, many of Chechen fighters whom we saw as ‘heroes of the independence 
struggle’ turned out to be outright criminals. And not just the bandits [were to 
blame]. The leadership in Grozny completely failed to build a civilized society, 
“declared Andrei Terkassov, a journalist who covered the last war for NTV, in an 
interview with a Western correspondent in October 1999.53 
The indignation of journalists was chiefly aroused by a series of kidnappings 
of colleagues which were carried out by Chechen criminal gangs.54 “In 1997, 
NTV reporter Yelena Masyk and a film crew were held by Chechen gangsters 
in a cave for 100 days. They were released only after NTV paid a seven figure 
ransom. TV stations’ coverage of Chechnya was never the same afterwards.”55 
53 Peter Graff, “Once Dovish Russia Media Now Chechnya Hawks”, Russia Today, 20 October 
1999, (http://www.russiatoday.com/features.php3?id=102570).
54 See Camilla Carr & Jonathan James, The Sky Is Always There: Surviving a Kidnapping in 
Chechnya, (Norwich: Canterbury, 2008).
55 Ibid.
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In a telephone survey of 500 Muscovites conducted by Public Opinion Foun-
dation in November 1999, seven out of ten respondents (70%) said that media 
coverage of the Second Chechen war had improved compared to that of the first 
war. Only 8% said that it was worse. Just over seven in ten (71%) considered that 
the media coverage of the Chechen forces’ actions was “complete and thorough” 
while only just over two in ten, (22%) thought that it was not. On the other hand, 
while over half of respondents, (53%) were dissatisfied with the coverage of the 
actions of Russian forces’, only 41% were being fully satisfied. Respondents also 
considered that more media coverage was devoted to the strategy and actions of 
the Russian side than to the Chechen side. 
Overall, the phone poll revealed that 37% believed that the coverage of the 
war was objective but nearly half (49%) took the opposite view. Interestingly 
enough, another telephone survey conducted in Moscow in mid-November dem-
onstrated that nearly two-third (64%) of those polled believed that they “have 
freedom of speech” in Russia, while 28% thought just the opposite.56  
The Presidential Campaign and the War
In comparison to the media coverage of the First Russian war in Chechnya, a cru-
cial difference was noted in the manner the war was presented on TV channels 
and in the print media. The predominantly positive and problem-free presentati-
on of a host of military engagements significantly contributed to marked changes 
in Russian public opinion concerning the war. In this section we will discuss how 
the war was reported and the reason why critical thinking was mostly absent in 
the media between mid-October and December of 1990.
As in the 1996 presidential election, the media proved highly instrumental 
in implementing a classical Leninist strategy based on launching an armada of 
“propagandists” and “agitators” to stir public emotions and engender outrage. 
The Kremlin now had more goals to achieve than in 1996, although the approach 
was the same. A marked difference, however, could be noted: the use of funds 
was more efficient and cost effective. 
Putin, an unknown ex-FSB chief who had only just been appointed Prime 
Minister by Yeltsin after the unexpected sacking of Sergei Stepashin on August 
9, 1999, quickly realized that he could make substantial political capital out of 
56 See Wojciech Jagielski, Towers of Stone: The Battle of Wills in Chechnya, (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2009), p. 23.
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the Russian armed forces’ successful operation in Dagestan in late August. The 
defeat of the Wahhabite rebels and the Army’s success in driving the Chechens 
out of Dagestan proved a windfall. Putin gained with one successful military 
strike both name recognition and popularity. The operation was not a total suc-
cess, though, as Putin failed to put down the Chechen guerrilla leaders. They 
were driven back to Chechnya, but not totally smashed. Under the slogan “strug-
gle against international terrorism,” Putin was not only able to launch an armed 
attack on Chechnya but also to begin his own electoral campaign for the presi-
dency. Yeltsin had already declared that he regarded Putin as his apparent suc-
cessor. However, such an endorsement could not be taken at face value, and was 
a dark shadow over the campaign, as the newcomer to Russian politics perceived 
this backing as more of a burden than a benefit. Yeltsin’s reputation, indeed, was 
now at its lowest domestically.57 To be labeled “Yeltsin’s man” did not give Putin 
an hedge in the incipient electoral campaign. Putin had to create his own political 
profile in order to have any real chance of prevailing over the already popular 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 
Yevgeny Primakov, who was already unofficially campaigning for succeeding 
Yeltsin.58 
The apartment blasts that hit two districts of Moscow in early September 
proved a catalyst in strengthening Putin’s political profile and carving out his im-
age as a politician willing to use an “iron hand” against the Chechen “terrorists”. 
His vigorous reaction and his September 24 solemn promise to the population to 
go after “terrorists everywhere” and to “corner the bandits in the toilet and wipe 
them out” brought his popularity to such a level that, according to opinion polls, 
he led voting intentions – over both Luzhkov and Primakov – by a large margin. 
Due to the consolidation of his hard-line “law and order” image, his popularity 
quickly rose from 2 to 13% in a matter of days.59 This surge in support for Pu-
tin was further exacerbated by the rapid mobilization of state-owned television 
channels RTV and ORT in an effective propaganda campaign. Their task was 
simple: To disseminate the Kremlin candidate’s position, and to effectively coun-
ter the campaign messages of both Luzhkov and Primakov. In the print media 
57 Gabriel Gorodetsky, Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshhold 
of the Twenty-First, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 189.
58 See Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya, (London; New York: TPP, 
2006), pp. 88-115.
59 Vitalij Tretyakov, “The Tale of Two Plots”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 October 1999, (http://
www.ng.ru/english/two_plots.html).
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Putin could already count on the loyal support of newspapers like Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, Novaya Izvestia, Kommersant and Ogoniok. 
While the two television channels helped Putin convert the Moscow bomb-
ings into immediate political capital, they became a hindrance to the Luzh-
kov campaign. As an elected mayor responsible, inter alia, for the “security” 
of Moscow residents, he in no time realized that the bombings threatened his 
political career at the local as well as the national level. They would not only 
shrink his chances of being re-elected in the December mayoral election but also 
gravely affect the national electoral campaign of his Fatherland-All Russia Party 
(Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya) in the possibly hard-fought December 19 Russian 
parliamentary elections. Luzhkov viewed these two elections as reliable barom-
eters of the likelihood of him winning the presidential election scheduled for the 
spring of 2000.
Luzhkov grasped that the people’s fear of new attacks had been transformed 
into an election issue that Putin was increasingly monopolizing.60 Therefore Lu-
zhkov also publicly declared his resolute support for the “fight against terror-
ism,” which was for all practical purposes, Putin’s war in Chechnya. Distancing 
himself from Putin’s hard line against the “Chechen bandits” would have been 
tantamount to political suicide. In order to ward off criticism for his lack of 
vigilance Luzhkov therefore introduced a string of restrictions and controls on 
“foreigners” in Moscow. According to Russkaya Mysl, Luzjkov even outshone 
Putin in populist attempts to turn the Chechens into scapegoats for the dreadful 
bombings.61
NTV and TV Tsentr also became an active participant in the war propagan-
da machine. Like ORT and RTV, which regarded propaganda as their “natural” 
responsibility to promote Putin for the forthcoming presidential election, NTV 
and TV Tsentr were on a mission to promote Luzhkov, who happened to main-
tain close ties with the owner of NTV and Media-Most, Vladimir Gusinsky. In 
the print media, Luzhkov could always count on the backing of Moskovskie 
Komsomolets and Segodnya, which were also controlled by Gusinsky. Much of 
what was being published or broadcasted came at the request of special interests 
groups and political agendas.
60 Sebastian Smith, op. cit., p. 77.
61 Yekaterina Mikhajlovskaja, “Parlamentskaja khronika”, Russkaya Mysl, 22-29 November 1999, 
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Luzhkov was not the only potential candidate able to whittle away at Putin’s 
high ratings. Gennady Zyuganov and Grigory Yavlinsky, the Communist Party 
and Yabloko party leaders respectively, declared very early in the campaign their 
support for Putin’s “war on terrorism” and the deployment of forces in northern 
Chechnya. Put simply, no candidate in the upcoming presidential election or the 
elections to the Duma could ignore the popular enthusiasm for tough methods 
and a hard line in Chechnya.
The two newly created liberal parties, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) and 
the Unity Party (“Edinstvo”), also sided with the warmongers. Neither of the two 
new formations had their own media outlets, but both could expect favorable 
and detailed coverage from both RTV and ORT. SPS was led by former Prime 
Minister Sergei Kirienko, however the party’s chief strategist and key figure was 
the head of the state-owned electrical power monopoly Unified Energy System 
(1998-2008) and former Privatization Minister Anatoly Chubais. As a member 
of the Kremlin’s inner circle, he could secure the party’s access to both RTV 
and ORT. Chubais expressed his position on the war effort in Chechnya in these 
words: “In Chechnya, the Russian Army is experiencing a renaissance; confi-
dence in the Army has been recreated, and a politician who does not believe this 
cannot be considered a Russian politician. In such cases, there is only one name 
for these politicians, traitor.”62 
The Unity Party was founded on the Kremlin’s initiative in September 1999 
to function as a counterweight to Luzhkov’s Otechestvo and pave the way for 
providing Putin with majority support at the Duma in the December 1999 par-
liamentary elections. The party was led by the Minister of Emergency Situations 
Sergei Shoigu, whose electoral campaign was widely covered by RTV and ORT. 
The Unity Party, indeed, crept up quickly in the December 1999 opinion polls, 
gathering more support than the Communist Party.63
In mid-November 1999 Putin, who was Prime Minister at the time, officially 
announced that he would run in the March 2000 presidential election. Until that 
declaration, Luzhkov had entertained the slim hope that the Kremlin would not 
bet on the former head of the FSB (one of the successor agencies to the KGB). 
After all, Yeltsin had not the habit of keeping his prime ministers in post for 
62 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 December 1999.
63 Tuck Wesolowsky, “Moscow Mayor Enjoys Support in Moscow as his Party Slips in Polls”, 16 
December 1999. 
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long. In parallel, opinion polls were indicating that Putin’s party, the Unity Party, 
would get more votes in the upcoming parliamentary elections than Luzhkov’s 
Otechestvo. A great success for the Unity Party in the November 199 elections 
would be a strong signal that Putin, rather than Luzhkov, would win the presi-
dential election a few months later. Given these circumstances, it was important 
for Luzhkov, who had previously given the impression of being a supporter not 
so much of Putin the man but of his policies in Chechnya, to distinguish himself 
from the Prime Minister’s plans of action.. One way Luzhkov could stand out 
against Putin, and among other contenders, was to distance himself from the 
ongoing escalation of the war in Chechnya. Luzhkov started to spread the idea of 
maintaining a cordon sanitaire around Chechnya and to emphasize that more lim-
ited military operations would be the most appropriate response to the Chechen 
rebels. Luzhkov’s strategy, although not misconceived overall, was, however, 
further weakened by a fierce smear campaign against him led by ORT. 
Luzhkov’s campaign redirection ‘coincided’ with NTV’s shift in its coverage 
of the war. NTV’s coverage of the conflict changed significantly; it became more 
balanced. Since NTV’s patron (Gusinsky) was now gravely weakened, as many 
political signs indicated that Russia’s next president would be neither Luzhkov 
nor Yevgeny Primakov, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Yeltsin, 
NTV (i.e., Media-Most and Gusinsky) had no more reason to support Putin’s 
line on Chechnya. The political calculation was that if Putin won the presidential 
election NTV would be far more vulnerable to pressure from the Kremlin than 
if Luzhkov won.64
In this situation, NTV chose to take a more critical stance on the war and was 
gradually joined by other Russian media outlets. By then, however, it was too 
late to influence Russian public opinion in a decisive way. Otechestvo’s bad elec-
toral choices in December and other parties’ slanders and gossiping quickly put 
an end to Luzhkov’s prospects of running in the Russian presidential election. 
Putin’s war remained popular, as evidenced by the above-mentioned surveys and 
support mechanism and effective PR.65  
64 Ibid.
65 See Dale R. Herspring, The Kremlin & the High Command: Presidential Impact on the Russian 
Military from Gorbachev to Putin, (University Press of Kansas, 2006).
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The Babitsky Affair 
NTV’s – and Luzhkov’s – more critical stance was immediately perceived by 
Putin’s electoral team as increasing the hazard of failure. His main concern du-
ring the 2000 election was to retake control in Chechnya, preferably achieving 
a complete victory a few weeks before the election. All that he needed was to 
reinforce the perception, created by the media, that positive results were being 
brought about by the Russian military, and that stabilization and peace were be-
ing established in Chechnya and the North Caucasus.66
In mid-January 2000 Andrei Babitsky, a Russian journalist covering the con-
flict for Radio Liberty’s Russian Bureau, was arrested under mysterious circum-
stances in Chechnya. Babitsky had gained great respect for his reporting during 
the previous 1994-96 Russian-Chechen war. At the time of his arrest he was one 
of the few independent journalists still reporting from behind Chechen lines. In 
December 1999 NTV presented a series of sensational videos in which Babitsky 
commented on the Russian Army’s movements and heavy bombings on Chechen 
territory. These videos aroused anger among both Russian politicians and the 
military community.67 In particular, Babitsky showed elaborately the bodies of 
dozens of dead Russian soldiers and officers – precisely the kind of footage that 
could undermine Putin’s presidential campaign. To his credit, Babitsky did not 
shy away from reporting Chechen atrocities too.
At the outset of the Russian bombing of the Chechen capital Grozny in 
January 2000, the Kremlin confidently announced that all civilians had left the 
city and, consequently, massive casualties were impossible. Babitsky, who had 
managed to get into the besieged Grozny, contradicted this official statement 
by reporting that civilians did remain in the bombed buildings. On January 15 
he disappeared. Russian officials at first denied that they knew anything about 
his whereabouts. However, a friend of Babitsky leaked that on January 16 he 
had been detained by the Russian Army while trying to flee Grozny. Twelve 
days later the authorities admitted to having him in custody. On February 4, 
2000  Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the Kremlin spokesman, announced that the Radio 
Liberty journalist had been handed over to Chechen insurgents in exchange for 
66 See Gary K. Bertsch [et.], Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2000).
67 Oleg Panfilov, “Babitsky - A Victim of Putin’s Valkamp,” Göteborgs-Posten, Vol. 44, 16 March 
1999.
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Russian soldiers held prisoners in the mountains. The Chechen President Aslan 
Maskhadov, as well as rebel commanders, denied ever having been involved in 
such an exchange.68
The Babitsky affair was perceived in the Russian media as a message to Rus-
sian journalists that the Kremlin would not accept reports which challenged the 
official line on the war. It also elicited a bold reaction from journalists. On Febru-
ary 9 about fifty Russian journalists signed an open letter, published in Russkaya 
Mysl, in which they condemned the political “authorities’ cynicism towards the 
media.” The article continued: “If Babitsky has ever done anything illegal, this 
should be determined by a judicial court through appropriate legal procedures. 
If Babitsky’s detention was the result of the content of his reports on the war in 
Chechnya, then, this is a clear violation of the freedom of the press guaranteed 
by Constitution,” wrote the journalists, who at the same time demanded to know 
the full truth about what had happened to Babitsky.69 
The signatories of the letter were mostly journalists working for Gusinsky’s 
media empire, which in turn endorsed Luzhkov’s candidacy. Later, some Com-
munist media outlets entered into a second round of accusations concerning the 
authorities’ treatment of the media and information. Babitsky was released on 
28 February 2000 on condition that he should not leave Moscow. On March 10, 
2000, in an interview with the newspaper Kommersant, Putin, laid the blame on 
Babitsky and charged him with treason and collaboration with Chechen war-
lords, and commented: “Here you say that he is a Russian citizen. Well, one has 
to obey the law of one’s country if one counts on being treated according to the 
law.”70
In October 2000, Babitsky was granted amnesty after having been tried for 
carrying a forged passport, which he claimed, had been slipped into his pockets 
by representatives of the Russian Army. 
Conclusion
The journalists who protested over the Babitsky affair demonstrated that they 
were capable of defending press freedom against the authorities’ arbitrary in-
68 See Aleksandro I. Kapidze (Ed.), Caucasus Region: Geopolitical Nexus?, (New York: Nova 
Science Publishers, 2007), pp. 44-56.
69 “Zajavlenie zhurnalistov o dejstvijakh rossijskikh vlastej po otnosheniju k Andreju Babitskomu”, 
Russkaya Mysl, 10-16 February 2000, p. 5.
70 Pavel Gutiontoyov, “Zauryadnoye Delo”, Delovoy Vtornik, 2 March 2010, (http://www.ruj.ru/
authors/gut/100303_4.htm).
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terference in the media and had the fortitude to do so. However, the fact that 
journalists’ first reaction came after a serious attempt by the authorities to silence 
one of their colleagues who had been critical of the government’s policy also re-
veals that the journalists’ obligation to act as society’s watchdog and facilitator of 
information sharing had not yet been fully understood or taken deep roots within 
the Russian and post Soviet journalism profession. Although many journalists 
were personally uncomfortable with he Kremlin’s crackdown on the independent 
media, the majority of them sat quietly back and watched without arguing the 
Russian government’s denial of access to the media of the human rights activist 
Sergei Kovalev and many other less well-known journalists. Also, for all the lies 
and falsehoods about the true extent of military operations in Chechnya, many 
journalists refused to accord them the revulsion that the government and the 
armed forces’ deeds deserved; they simply diverted attention to other aspects of 
the conflict and conjured up a non-alarmist image of what was going on the gro-
und. That attitude cast a shadow of doubt over journalists’ credibility and their 
professional ethics.
Protests in connection with the Babitsky case testified to the possibility of 
protest in Russia at that time and to the effect they could produce on the political 
authorities. These protests, in several ways, came too late, though. They did not 
serve as a warning signal to the political forces – as personified by Putin – which 
were gaining ground in the Russian political spectrum with the help of the media. 
They also came too late to change people’s views on the war in Chechnya and to 
strengthen the hope which many inside and outside Russia had entertained, i.e. 
that the Russian media had finally consolidated itself as an independent sphere 
embedded between the political power and the market.
In the period following the 1999 Chechnya war, the Russian media started to 
look more and more like the Soviet media. When Putin became president of the 
Russian Federation – as a protégé of Boris Yeltsin’s close circle of supporters – in 
March 2000, the Russian media were again tamed by a much more authoritarian 
political regime than Yeltsin’s regime. Independence and freedom were crushed. 
He significantly increased the influence of state-owned media and the state’s 
control over private media. Furthermore, his attack against the oligarchs was 
a deliberate attempt to get rid of pluralism in the Russian media and to assure 
the supremacy of the state. For instance, journalists continued to be victims of 
violent attacks. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) ranked Russia at that 
time as one of the 10 most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist.71
71 Robert Coalson, “We have Definitely Moved Backwards: An Overview of Media in Russia”, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Online, 18 June 2004, (http://www.rferl.org/reports/
mm/2004/06/11-180604.asp).   
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Putin tightened the grip over the media both through legal nationalization 
of several powerful media channels and through the enactment of laws that re-
stricted media freedom and independence. As a result, according to Freedom 
House, Russia’s press freedom rating dropped from 142 in 2004 to 148 in 2005, 
a ranking that put it into the category of “not free” press.72 
Two new policy changes transformed the Russian media landscape from a 
“partly free” to a “not free” sector. In January 2000, Putin extended control over 
the media by signing a new law that transferred the administration of govern-
ment subsidies for regional newspapers from local elected representatives to the 
press ministry. Two thousand small and subsidized newspapers were affected by 
the law, which beefed-up the central government’s control.73 In September 2000, 
the newly-elected President approved the Information Security Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation. The doctrine developed the National Security Concept of the 
Russian Federation as applied to the information sphere.74
 
72 Ibid.
73 Emma Gray, “Putin’s Media War”, CPJ Press Freedom Report, 27 March 2000, (http://www.cpj.
org/Briefings/2000/Russia_analysis_March00/Russia_analysis_march00.html).
74 See the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA), 18 
September 2000,  (http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/0/0249fa400056cb2f4325699c003b636f?OpenD
ocument). 
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